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ABSTRACT
Distribution grids across the world are undergoing profound changes due to advances in energy tech-
nologies. Electrification of the transportation sector and the integration of Distributed Energy Re-
sources (DERs) such as photo-voltaic panels and energy storage devices has gained substantial mo-
mentum, especially at the edge of the grid. However, the massive transformation in the technological
aspects of the grid could directly conflict with existing utility business models and tariff structures
applied to retail customers. This paper proposes a restructured business model where the implemen-
tation of these grid-edge technologies is aligned with the interest of all stakeholders involved in the
electricity ecosystem. This envisions a shift from treating electricity as a commodity where the users
are charged based on their volumetric consumption, to treating it as a service provided to the end-user
by the utility company based on the principle of cost-causation. The proposed rate structure considers
the impact of individual customers on the distribution grid by calculating metrics that contribute di-
rectly to the costs incurred by the utility companies, namelymagnitude and variability of the demand.
1. Introduction
Distributed energy resources (DERs) have been integrated
to the electric grid edge at an accelerated pace over the past
decade. The levelized costs of photo-voltaic (PV) panels and
energy storage have dropped significantly and are projected
to continue this trend [14]. Behind-The-Meter (BTM) tech-
nologies are estimated tomake up over 50% of the US energy
storage market by 2021, with the deployed energy storage
expected to reach 2 GW by then [24].
Despite the fact that end-use demand is projected to in-
crease in the next few decades both in the residential and
commercial sectors, there is a significant projected reduc-
tion in energy intensity [17]. Further, projections indicate
that the growth rate of electricity sales will be diminished
due to the significant increase in generation from rooftop PV
systems, from both residential and commercial buildings [3].
The adoption of Electric Vehicles (EVs) is also on the rise,
with the number of EVs on the road in the US reaching 1.1
million by the end of 2018 [19]. With increased installation
of these technologies many consumers are turning into pro-
sumers, thus eroding the revenue stream of the utilities [21].
The rise in DER penetration in markets around the globe
makes the following question extremely relevant - are the
existing utility business models poised to handle the accel-
erated pace of DER deployment at the grid edge? This paper
addresses customer rate models of distribution utility com-
panies i.e. how they recover their costs from customers. Dis-
tribution utilities need to be compensated for their invest-
ments and the grid maintenance costs they incur to ensure
reliable power supply to all customers. Their compensation
is akin to a toll fee for using the distribution utilityâĂŹs grid
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infrastructure.
The existing transmission and distribution utility (TDU)
charges are fashioned as a combination of a small fixed charge,
coupled with a larger volumetric ¢/kWh charge - the dotted
line in Fig. 1 represents the cost curve to consumers of this
rate structure [1]. Clearly, the revenue earned by utilities
is directly proportional to the volume of electricity in kWh
that is consumed by the end-users. This rate structure incen-
tivizes utilities to maximize sales andmakes them dependent
on the volumetric charge for the bulk of their revenue [13].
With the increased deployment of grid-edge DERs the cur-
rent rate design could be insufficient since it does not fully
account for the rising fixed costs faced by the utilities [18].
Grid-edge DERs pose a threat to the revenue stream of util-
ity companies in a few different ways. Firstly, the increase
in solar PV penetration directly results in reduction of kWh
demand from the grid. This reduces the customer’s utility
bill, even though the utility offers the service of access to the
grid at all times, which the PV customer will require when
the sun goes down. Secondly, the expansion of participation
in net metering has resulted in utilities providing financial
compensation for electricity injections from PV to the grid
[23]. Costello [10] argues that there are a number of issues
with net metering, including that it is inefficient and an unfair
cross-subsidy.
The increased deployment of AdvancedMetering Infras-
tructure (AMI) technologies provides an enabling platform
for retail rate innovations that could improve upon the cur-
rent volumetric rate structure.
There has been a number of case studies devoted to ex-
amining the effect of high DER penetration on regulatory,
technological and economic aspects in the distribution grid.
The resulting need for utilities to update their business mod-
els, and a rebalancing of costs on the electricity value chain
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from the grid side to behind the meter has been discussed
in [29] and [28] respectively. Baak [5] and Pelegry [25]
explore the regulatory framework in different parts of the
world, and the restructuring that may be required to enable
an accelerated transformation towards grid modernization,
while Gellings [15] argues that the existing regulatory mea-
sures may be adequate to accommodate even a transformed
future. Laws et al. [22] indicates that residential PV penetra-
tion could reach a substantial number over the next decade.
But, they argue that utilities have ample time to change their
business model in order to avoid the death spiral. Darghouth
et al. [11] shows how various rate design choices can impact
the long term cumulative distributed PV deployment.
Burger and Luke [9] provides a comprehensive review of
the various business models that exist for various categories
of DER technologies. Bird et al. [8] provides an analysis
of how different rate structures, namely fixed charges, mini-
mum bills and higher demand rates impact the bills of resi-
dential customers in a number of states across the US. Baatz
[6] provides a summary of a number of recent studies on
various rate structures such as Time-of-Use (TOU), Critical
Peak Pricing (CPP) etc. Schwartz [27] presents the pros and
cons of various rate designs. Namely, raising fixed charges
for all customers may disproportionately impact low-income
customers. Minimum bills do not necessarily fix the utility
revenue problem. Demand charges are usually applied to the
customer’s peak demand regardless of whether it is coinci-
dent with distribution system demand. Revesz and Unel [26]
reviews the net-metering related tariff changes in a number
of jurisdictions in the US. They also argue for an approach
that values clean distributed energy for its social impacts
such as environmental benefits and reduced losses. Faruqui
et al. [13] suggests transitioning residential customers to
three-part rates, comprising of a monthly fixed charge, a vol-
umetric charge, and a demand charge. In [16] an analysis of
BTM storage adoption under a storage-friendly rate is pre-
sented.
In [7], a Distribution Network Use-of-System (DNUoS)
charge has been proposed, which aids in accurate recovery
of distribution utility costs, by capturing the contribution of
each user on the network to the system’s costs. This paper
applies a similar line of thought, by billing the customers
based on their individual contributions to system costs.
In view of the above, the key contributions of this paper
are as follows:
• A methodology to quantify the impact of individual
customers on the grid based on demand magnitude
and variability metrics has been proposed
• A novel utility rate mechanism has been formulated,
which calculates TDU charges for individual customers
based on the cost causation principle
• Numerical case studies have been developed using data
from real residential customers with a high penetra-
tion of EVs and Solar PVs, to simulate the effect of
the proposed rate mechanism
Figure 1: Current vs. Proposed TDU Charges: Consumer Cost
Curve
• The deployment of battery storage has been simulated
to assess its effect on the grid impact of customers
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section
2 highlights the deficiencies in the existing utility business
model, and describes the design details and mathematical
formulation of the proposed billing mechanism. Section 3 is
a critical comparison of the existing and proposed new utility
business models, supported by a case study using real resi-
dential customer data. Section 4 summarizes the key learn-
ings and the most significant policy implications of the pro-
posed utility business model.
2. Methodology and Data
2.1. Present Utility Business Model
The proposed TDU charge features the introduction of a
single grid-access fee, which would completely replace the
traditional âĂĲsmall fixed + large volumetricâĂİ structure
of utility pricing. The uniqueness of this idea lies in how
these grid-access fees would be customer-specific; calcu-
lated for each customer by taking into account some key pa-
rameters that define the impact of said customer to the grid.
This impact is quantified through a combination of weight-
ing factors called Grid Impact Factors.
This concept is analogous to an insurance rate model or
a credit score, where each customerâĂŹs rate/credit limit is
considered to accurately reflect the risk level taken up by
the insurance company / bank by entering into business with
said customer. An example of providing appropriate incen-
tives in electricity wholesale markets is FERCOrder 755 [4].
Prior to this Order, most ISO markets in the US had a sin-
gle capacity payment for regulation. Regulation payments
were not tied to resource performance. As a result of this
rule a two-part payment was enacted, which added a mileage
based component that accounts for the performance of the
resource, in addition to the capacity based payment.
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As is evident from Fig. 1, the utility company does not
have revenue assurance i.e. they have to hope that consumers
use more kWh, thus driving up their revenue. However, un-
der the proposed approach the utility has a steady and as-
sured income from each consumer via the fixed Grid Access
Fees. In the figure, Customer 2 has a lower grid impact than
Customer 1, and thus is charged a lower Grid Access Fee.
2.2. Metrics causing Distribution Grid
Investments
In the context of a distribution grid, the installed capacity
of the system is a key parameter - it determines how much
load can be served. Depending on changing load patterns
this limit also dictates the need for capital investment. Sys-
tem capacity requirements are directly dependent on the sys-
tem Peak Demand to be supplied to the customers. Thus, the
"Peak Demand Time Slots" are a critical time for the system.
To account for this, a Demand Magnitude Impact Factor푊
is introduced, that measures the demand impact weight of
each home during the peak demand time slots.
Demand Impact Weight of Home 푖 (푊푖)
= Total Demand of Home 푖 during Peak Slots (1)
Another key concern for the distribution grid is the health
of the existing infrastructure. This directly impacts the cap-
ital investment and maintenance costs that the utility incurs.
The health of grid infrastructure is correlated to its load-
ing conditions and the fluctuations in demand. These fluc-
tuations are measured using the Demand Variability Impact
Factor푉 , during the peak variability time slots of each home.
Variability Impact Weight of Home 푖 (푉푖)
= Total Variability of Home 푖 during Peak Slots (2)
2.3. Peak Indicator Functions
With the objective ofmaking the rate structure as flexible
and general as possible, the idea of Peak Indicator Functions
for Demand and Variability has been introduced. These take
as inputs the present system conditions, the peak threshold
for the system conditions, and a strictness parameter 푘, to
deliver an indication of whether the system condition at that
time 푡 is considered to be a peak slot or not. When 푘 is very
small, the Peak is considered based on a very strict cut-off,
whereas if 푘 is larger, the function also begins to consider
those time slots where System Demand (푆푡) is almost equal
to the peak threshold, thus reducing the importance and em-
phasis placed on an inherently arbitrary definition of peak
threshold.
Distribution grids have diverse load profiles, even be-
tween different feeders within the same utility service ter-
ritory. The proposed mechanism provides the grid operator
the option to use their engineering judgment to select peak
thresholds and 푘 values that are best suited for their system
conditions.
Peak Indicator Functions have been defined for Peak De-
mand Magnitude (푆) and Peak Demand Variability (훽) as 휇
and 휆 respectively. These are described below.
Figure 2: Peak Demand Magnitude Indicator Function 휇
Figure 3: Peak Demand Variability Indicator Function 휆
2.3.1. Peak Demand Magnitude Indicator 휇
This function is designed similar to a logistic function, and
is centered around the System Peak Threshold value푆PeakTh.
푆PeakTh is calculated based on a percentile value that can beset by the distribution grid operator. If the peak threshold
percentage is set as 15%, then 푆PeakTh = 85푡ℎ percentile ofSystem load duration curve. This means that a given time
slot 푡 is defined as a peak demand time slot when 푆푡 ≥
푆PeakTh. In essence, this function returns 1 if it is a peak slot,and 0 if not. For a given time 푡, 휇 is described as follows:
휇푡 = 1
1 + 푒
−(푆푡−푆PeakTh)
푘
2.3.2. Peak Demand Variability Indicator 휆
The Variability indicator has the additional unique prop-
erty of being unbounded, thus it not only indicates that a
given slot is a peak slot, but it also captures how big the peak
is, i.e. it quantifies the peak.
Similar to 푆PeakTh, 훽PeakTh is calculated based on a per-centile value that can be set by the distribution grid operator
A given time slot 푡 is defined as a peak variability time slot
when 훽푡 ≥ 훽PeakTh. For a given time 푡, 휆 is defined as fol-lows:
휆푡 = 푘 ln(1 + 푒
(훽푡−훽PeakTh)
푘 )
2.4. Calculating the Grid Impact Factors푊 and 푉
Let 푋푡푖 = Demand of user 푖 at time 푡
푑푋푡푖 = Change in Demand of user 푖 between time 푡 and 푡−1
i.e. 푑푋푡푖 = 푋푡푖 −푋푡−1푖
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2.4.1. Element-Wise Multiplication
푊 푡푖 = 푋
푡
푖 ⋅ 휇
푡
푊푖 =
∑
푡
푊 푡푖
푉 푡푖 = 푑푋
푡
푖 ⋅ 휆
푡
푉푖 =
∑
푡
푉 푡푖
(3)
2.4.2. Matrix Multiplication
푊푁×1 = 푋푁×푇 ⋅ 휇푇×1
푁 homes, 푇 timesteps
푉푁×1 = 푑푋푁×(푇−1) ⋅ 휆(푇−1)×1
푁 homes, (푇 − 1) time differences
(4)
2.4.3. Relative Weight (% Allocation) for each Home 푖
푊share 푖 =
푊푖∑푁
푗=1푊푗
푉share 푖 =
푉푖∑푁
푗=1 푉푗
(5)
2.5. Calculating the Final Bills
Let 퐵old푖 total → Total Bill of home 푖 calculated in the currentmethod, and 퐵new푖 total → Total Bill of home 푖 calculated in theproposed method.
To calculate bills for each home under the currentmech-
anism, we consider a standard volumetric rate formula for
TDU Charges defined below (5 ¢per kWh) (푋푡푖 > 0):
퐵푡 old푖 = $0.05 ×푋
푡
푖 (6)
In case a home generates more than it consumes at any
point in time, i.e. 푋푡푖 < 0, the excess electricity is sold backto the grid at a discounted rate of 2 ¢per kWh (NetMetering).
퐵푡 old푖 = −$0.02 ×푋
푡
푖 (7)
So, the total TDU Charges in the current mechanism for
the full 2 year period is calculated as follows.
퐵old푖 total =
∑
푡
(퐵푡 old푖 ) (8)
In the proposed rate calculationmechanism, customers
are charged a fixed monthly bill based on their Grid Impact
Factors. This fixed charge is calculated by starting from the
total target revenue for the utility company. This is the re-
verse approach of the existing mechanism, thus a stark dif-
ference from the procedure followed in the current scheme,
where the individual customer’s rate is based on a fixed for-
mula, and an aggregation of all customers’ payments gives
the total revenue for the utility company.
It is assumed that the $/kWh rate is derived from the total
target revenue of the system, which is obtained as a result of
the current rate case process. This rate case is determined
by a joint effort between the utility and regulator, to ensure
accuracy and fairness to utility and customer alike.
For simplicity, the work in this paper operates under the
assumption that the total target revenue is calculated for the
full period of assessment - in the case study described in
the paper, this period of assessment is 2 years. Further, to
make a fair and direct comparison of the current and pro-
posed mechanisms, this total target revenue for the utility
company has been fixed as the 퐵old푖 total value, i.e.,
푁∑
푖=1
퐵old푖 total =
푁∑
푖=1
퐵new푖 total (9)
This essentially results in a redistribution of the same fi-
nal cost among the customers. This is a fair assumption to
make because the total target revenue for the current mech-
anism is calculated through the rate case process, which is
assumed to be an accurate reflection of system costs.
Since the new mechanism has to account for two con-
tributing grid impact factors 푊 and 푉 , the importance of
these respective weighting factors are determined by the al-
location percentage parametersΠ푉 andΠ푊 (also determinedby the utility and regulator), defined as follows:
Π푊 = % Allocation of Total Target Revenue for푊
Π푉 = % Allocation of Total Target Revenue for 푉And so, finally, the total bill for each home 푖 as per the
new scheme is calculated as a linear combination of theweight-
ing factors scaled with their respective allocation percentage
parameters, as follows:
퐵new푖 total = 푊share 푖 × Π푊 + 푉share 푖 × Π푉 (10)
2.6. Data and Case Study System Description
The data used for the results discussed in Section 3 is
the instantaneous kW demand for 200 residential customers,
measured at a resolution of 1-minute. The dataset spanning
a period of two years (from 01-01-2016 to 12-31-2017) was
obtained from Pecan Street Dataport [2].
3. Results and Discussion
To thoroughly examine the effects of the new billingmech-
anism, we calculate the bills for each home in a system of 200
residential demand profiles, with 25% penetration of EVs
and PVs each, i.e. 50 EV homes and 50 PV homes among
the 200 total homes.
For the purpose of this example, we set the 푆PeakTh and
훽PeakTh at the 75th percentile of total system demand and totalsystem variability respectively. Also, the % Allocations of
Total Target Revenue Π푊 and Π푉 are set as 75% and 25%respectively.
3.1. Comparing the Performance of Two Homes in
the Proposed Mechanism
To illustrate the effects of the proposed scheme, we ex-
amine two homes which have a similar bill in the current
scheme but a significant difference in bills in the proposed
scheme.
In Fig. 4 (top), the system demand curve has been plotted
along with the Peak Threshold line (red), indicating which
intervals are considered to be peak time slots. Fig. 4 (bot-
tom) depicts the individual demand of the higher impact and
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Figure 4: System Demand Curve and Winner vs. Loser Comparison during Peak Time Slots
Figure 5: Comparison of Proposed and Existing Billing Mechanism for Homes
lower impact homes during the system peak time slots, and
is assumed to be zero for non-peak time slots.
Despite having a few spikes of demand, the demand of
Home 1 during the peak time slots is, for the most part, less
than that of Home 2. Furthermore, Home 2 has a negative
demand for several time periods each day i.e. it is generating
more power than it consumes, indicating that it is a solar PV
home. The fact that this home is a higher impact home can
be explained by the benefit given to solar PV homes in the
current scheme due to net metering. In the proposed scheme,
such demand variability is penalized through the 푉 parame-
ter.
3.2. Comparing the Current and Proposed Billing
Mechanisms
Fig. 5 describes the effect of the proposed billing mech-
anism for each subset of homes. This effect is quantified by
evaluating the percentage change between the proposed bill
and the current bill, i.e. 퐵new푖 total − 퐵old푖 total for each home. Thedistribution of this range has been plotted, categorized based
on the type of home: EV Homes, PV Homes, and non-DER
Homes.
In the case of EV homes, most homes have a negative %
change of 퐵new푖 total−퐵old푖 total. This means that almost all homeshave a lower bill in the proposed mechanism than they do in
the current mechanism. As a result, it seems that the pro-
posed billing mechanism is favorable for EVs. This follows
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Figure 6: % Change in Bills before and after 25% DER Penetration (Calculated under the Proposed Mechanism)
intuition, because in the current billing mechanism, all that
matters for billing is howmuch kWh volume is consumed by
the home. Whereas in the proposed billing algorithm, the
impact of the user is calculated during the peak time slots
of demand, where the distribution system is under the most
stress. Thus, under the proposed billing mechanism, there is
great potential for smart scheduling of EV charging during
the non-peak periods, which could lead to significant sav-
ings for those homes. As a result, the interests of both the
distribution utility and the user are aligned.
When we observe the trend for PV homes, most homes
have a positive% change of퐵new푖 total−퐵old푖 total, whichmeans thatalmost all PV homes have a significant increase in their bill
when evaluated under the proposed mechanism. While this
observation seems to suggest that the proposed mechanism
is unfavorable to PV homes, it can be argued that the pro-
posed mechanism is capturing the true costs of PV that were
previously (unfairly) being borne by non-PV homes. Despite
the fact that the kWh volume of consumption for PV homes
is less, the sudden ramping of PV during the late evening
causes significant strain on the distribution grid. This aspect
is captured in the new billing scheme through the Variability
impact factor 푉 .
Let us now consider the case of non-DER homes. Most
homes have a negative percentage change value for 퐵new푖 total −
퐵old푖 total. More specifically, of the 100 non-DER homes, al-most 90 have a negative 퐵new푖 total−퐵old푖 total, with 70 homes hav-ing a slightly negative change (0-20% reduction in bill). This
indicates that most non-DER homes are being benefited by
the proposed billing mechanism. This addresses one of the
key drawbacks of the current utility billing scheme, where
in many cases, costs incurred by the utilities in their PV-
incentive programs such as net metering or other subsidies
would be recovered from the non-PV customers via increase
in the fixed charges. With the proposed mechanism, the
trend of penalizing non-PV customers is reversed, bringing
the distribution of bills back to balance.
3.3. The Effect of DER Penetration on Bills
Calculated under the Proposed Mechanism
Fig. 6 describes the effect of penetration of individual
DERs (EV and PV) on each subset of homes. In the default
system, there is a DER penetration of 25% EV and 25% PV
(50 homes each). In the system without EV, the DER pene-
tration is 0% EV (0 homes) and 25% PV (50 homes). Simi-
larly in the system without PV, the DER penetration is 25%
EV (50 EV homes) and 0% PV (0 PV Homes). In the system
without DERs, the DER penetration is 0%, i.e. 0% EV and
0% PV. The left figure compares the bills of the EV Homes
calculated in the default system vs the system without EVs.
The middle figure compares bills of PV homes calculated
in the default system vs the system without PV generation.
The right figure shows the effect on bills of non-DER homes
due to DER penetration in the system, by comparing the bills
calculated in the default system vs the system with 0% DER
penetration.
When considering the effect of EV penetration on EV
homes, it is observed that most homes have a positive %
change between with and without EV cases, thus following
the expected trend of having higher electricity bills due to
the presence of an EV.
With PV however, the story is different. Some PV homes
seem to benefitwith the introduction of PV (around 30 homes),
but the rest have a higher bill with the introduction of PV.
One factor could be explained by the variability index 푉 ac-
counting for 25% of the total revenue, and that the PV homes
have the highest variability impact factors. Another issue
could be that PVs are pulling down the system conditions
below peak threshold when the sun is shining, and shifting
peak slots to different times. This leads to a very interesting
thought: the application of solar + storage technology com-
bined with smart scheduling for maximizing usage during
system non-peak conditions could be the optimal strategy in
the proposed billing scheme. This has been explored in the
case study discussed in Section 3.4.
Looking at the effect of DER penetration on non-DER
homes, it is noted that every single non-DER home has seen
a reduction in their electric bills due to the penetration of
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Figure 7: % Change in Bills (New Mechanism) after introducing Battery Storage in 25 PV Homes
DER. While this seems like the proposed mechanism re-
wards customers for not investing in DER, it is more accurate
to view this as evidence that a fair cost recovery from DER
homes is happening because of DER homes having an in-
crease in their grid impact, due to the penetration of DERs.
3.4. Effect of Battery Storage on Bills calculated
under the Proposed Mechanism
Fig. 7 shows the effect of penetration of battery storage
in the system on the bills calculated under the proposed rate
mechanism. In this case study, half of the PV homes (25
out of 50) are given a battery storage unit, that operates un-
der a brute force algorithm, charging during non-peak hours
(1AM - 3AM), and discharging during typical peak hours
(5PM - 7PM), with a rate of 2 kW for both charge and dis-
charge cycles. Essentially, this is meant to reduce impact
on grid by discharging during peak time slots, and charging
during non-peak time slots.
Fig. 7 (top-right) shows that every single ‘PV+battery’
home has experienced a reduction in bill due to the introduc-
tion of battery storage. This reduction has been observed de-
spite the fact that a brute force charging-discharging sched-
ule was implemented. This result could be further improved
if the battery storage devices are operated under a smart-
scheduling algorithm, that not only reduces impact during
peak time slots, but also counteracts spikes in variability of
the system, thus earning rewards for positive contributions
to grid conditions.
The other 3 sub-figures in Fig. 7 show the effects of the
introduction of battery systems in 25 PV homes on the other
categories of homes. Homes in all of these categories seemi-
nor increases in their bills, so it could be argued that the pro-
posed mechanism provides the most rewards for customers
having PV+ battery storage, who aremore likely to be richer
customers, at the expense of non-DER customers, who may
be less affluent and cannot afford PVs and battery storage.
However, when comparing the bills of these non-DER cus-
tomers under the proposed and current schemes, it is clear
that these homes will still be better off than they are under
the current scheme.
3.5. Pros and Cons of the Proposed Mechanism
3.5.1. Pros
Revenue Decoupling The mechanism introduced in this
work effectively decouples utility revenue and customer bills
from volumetric consumption. This is important to the long-
term stability of utility revenues, since due to the growing
penetration of DERs, volumetric charge based revenue could
decline in the future.
Recovers Utility Costs Accurately and Effectively The
proposed mechanism is more representative of the true costs
inflicted upon the distribution grid by the customers, due to
the usage of kW rather than kWh as a defining metric. The
major driver for investment costs in equipment is the con-
sumer demand during peak periods. Thus, the proposed ap-
proach provides better alignment between the revenue and
costs as compared to the volumetric charge. The introduc-
tion of ’Variability’ is also a novel approach. The variable
nature of renewable resources adversely impacts the efficient
operation of the grid and as such should be accounted for in
the cost recovery mechanism.
Utility Revenue Targets are Assured to Be Met There
is a key and prominent distinction between the proposedmech-
anism and the current model - rather than expecting a total
revenue for the utility depending on several variables, the
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proposed mechanism offers the utility the opportunity to en-
sure a stable and assured revenue. This is because the total
target revenue is first set, and then the proposed mechanism
allocates the costs to all customers appropriately. Another
advantage is that this form of rate-making could require less
frequent rate cases, which is a time-consuming and expen-
sive process.
Reduces Unfair Cross-Subsidy Both the current volu-
metric charge and the net-metering policies result in utilities
over-recovering costs from non-PV customers while under-
recovering them from PV customers. Further, there is a high
likelihood that non-PV customers fall in the low-income cat-
egory, while PV customer fall in the high-income category.
Thus the proposed mechanism mitigates against the existing
unfair and regressive cross-subsidy. Further, the proposed
approach is consistent for all types of DERs. This is impor-
tant to incentivize technologies such as energy storage.
Retains Efficiency Incentive Under the current volumet-
ric mechanism increasing efficiency reduces electricity sales
and therefore profits [20]. The proposed billing mechanism
retains the incentive for the utility to be efficient. Since the
total revenue target is controlled under this structure, the util-
ity is incentivized to take action to improve system efficiency
so as to get higher profits. Regulators could also include ex-
plicit performance bonuses for utilities improving their effi-
ciency.
3.5.2. Cons
Peak Threshold Calculation Unfair to Solar PV? As
mentioned earlier, the introduction of PV could cause the to-
tal system demand to go below the peak threshold in some
time slots, thus converting those time slots from peak slots
to non-peak slots. However, this also shifts the peak slots to
a different time, because of the fact that peak slots are de-
fined on a percentile basis, rather than absolute. There will
always be a top 푥% set of values; it does not matter whether
that range is small or large. As a result, the new system peak
time slots would be those times when perhaps the sun does
not shine. The appliance usage of a PV home is not offset
when the sun is not shining, therefore these new shifted peak
slots could be when the PV homes stop generating, and de-
mand power from the grid, thus contributing to increase in
the system demand. These slots are now the peak slots, and
PV homes along with all other homes contribute to their푊
and 푉 impact factors significantly during this time. Thus,
it could lead to the situation where non-PV homes get away
with ’bad’ usage patterns when the sun is shining, because
PV homes are generating enough power to reduce the stress
on the system below the system peak threshold. Essentially,
some non-PV homes escape penalization due to their behav-
ior being covered or compensated for by the PV homes.
This problem could be easily dealt with when rolling out
the proposed mechanism in practice: peak thresholds could
potentially be selected by distribution grid operators based
on distribution feeder capacity, for the feeders on which this
algorithm is being implemented. This wouldmake the thresh-
olds absolute, rather than relative.
Solar PV ancillary benefits It could be argued that Solar
PV is not being rewarded for the various benefits it brings
to the grid or indeed its societal benefit in terms of reduc-
ing pollution. Distributed PV systems likely provide ancil-
lary benefits such as reducing distribution system losses by
generating close to the point of consumption, and in the fu-
ture also might offer frequency and voltage support services
through the use of smart inverters [12].
Rate simplicity Clarity and simplicity is a consideration
for rate design. In this respect the volumetric rate has an
advantage since customers have become accustomed to it.
On the other hand it could be argued that customers are also
familiar with the concept of credit scores, and being subject
to different interest rates relative to other customers, based
on their individual risk to the lender.
3.6. Policy Implications
The current volumetric rate structure has some clear draw-
backs, the first being that the utility is not assured of suffi-
cient revenues, and the second that there is effectively an un-
fair cross-subsidy from non-PV customers to PV customers.
Since with declining revenues the utility would be forced to
raise the rates for everyone. The proposed approach provides
long-term stability to the utility. PV customers could face
higher bills, but this could be considered appropriate given
that the energy they contribute may not be coincident with
peak demand, which is a large driver of distribution system
costs. Moreover, if such customers also had optimally oper-
ating storage, their bills could be reduced.
With the introduction of metrics such as peak thresh-
olds and % Allocation, the utility has far greater flexibility to
modify the billing mechanism based on the true costs they
incur, customized for their system conditions.
Regulators should be careful not to favor a particular
technology and rate designs should be based on the true value
of energy provided by DER assets.
4. Concluding Remarks
With the increasing penetration of DER technologies,
utilities are likely to face challenges associated with the cur-
rent volumetric rate design. Regulators should consider al-
ternative rate designs that are better aligned with the cost-
causation principle.
This paper introduces an algorithm to calculate a fixed,
customer-specific grid access fee, based on metrics that con-
tribute directly to the true costs incurred by the distribu-
tion utility in providing electric power to their customers.
As a result, the volumetric throughput incentive is elimi-
nated, thus aligning the interests of both the distribution util-
ity as well as the end-users towards a future distribution grid
with higher DER penetration. This has been accomplished
through a shift in philosophy, from treating electricity as a
commodity to Electricity as a Service.
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Future workwill have to answer some key questions: fur-
ther insight needs to be gained on how to calculate the actual
Total Target Revenue, such that it recovers the costs incurred
by utilities under different system conditions. The effect of
smart-scheduling algorithms that respond to real-time sig-
nals of system performance needs to be tested. Applying this
on solar+storage could be transformative, and thus needs to
be explored. Further, this holds great potential for customer
aggregation, where groups of customers form such that these
customers’ consumption patterns could be negatively corre-
lated with each other. This could reduce the group impact
on the grid, thus reducing their bill as part of a group, com-
pared to their bill when considered as individual customers.
Smart-scheduling and real-time adaptive consumption pat-
terns could be leveraged in such aggregation mechanisms
to negate the spikes and troughs of other customers in the
group.
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